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Abstract
The debate over the exercise of primary and secondary 
constituent power is a long-lasting one and is grounded 
on positions diverging according to the interpretation 
of constitutionalism and democracy, and to the concep-
tion of constitution’s flexibility. In order to safeguard the 
sacrality of the fundamental Charter at the same time 
ensuring its flexibility, framers, moreover after WWII, en-
trenched therein both specific procedures for the exer-
cise of the secondary constituent power and clauses for 
the protection of constitutional fundamentals. After the 
exhaustion of the primary constituent power, a relevant 
role has been played by Supreme Courts, which ensured 
the enforceability of the abovementioned clauses and 
procedures, and, in some cases, inferred them in the 
lack of explicit constitutional provisions. The Brazilian 
Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) is among those Courts 
which had to infer their competence in reviewing consti-
tutional amendments from the unamendability clauses 
Abstract
O debate sobre o exercício do poder constituinte originário 
e derivado é duradouro e se baseia em posições divergentes 
de acordo com a interpretação do constitucionalismo e da 
democracia, e com a concepção da flexibilidade da Consti-
tuição. A fim de salvaguardar a sacralidade da Carta funda-
mental, assegurando ao mesmo tempo a sua flexibilidade, 
os seus fundadores, principalmente após a Segunda Guerra 
Mundial, incluíram procedimentos específicos para o exer-
cício do poder constituinte derivado e cláusulas sobre a 
proteção dos valores constitucionais fundamentais. Após o 
esgotamento do poder constituinte originário, uma função 
relevante foi desempenhada pelos Supremos Tribunais, o 
que garantiu a aplicabilidade das cláusulas e procedimen-
tos acima mencionados, e em alguns casos identificou-os 
diante da falta de disposições constitucionais explícitas. 
O Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro (STF) está entre os 
tribunais que tiveram que inferir sua competência de con-
trolar a constitucionalidade de emendas constitucionais a 
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, UNAMENDABILITY CLAU-
SES AND CONSTITUTIONAL CORE VALUES
The debate over the exercise of primary and secondary constituent power1 is 
a long-lasting one and is grounded on different interpretations of constitutionalism 
and democracy. The sacrality – and consequent unamendability – of the constitutio-
nal Charter John Locke entrenched in 1660 Carolina’s Constitution opposes to Edmund 
Burke’s conception that the lack of tools for ensuring flexibility endangers the possibili-
ty of preserving the Constitution. In a nutshell, building on Burke, if no rules for modifi-
cations are provided, then the whole text can be legally modified through the ordinary 
legislative procedure. This has been the case, i.e., of the 1848 Italian Albertine Statute, 
defined perpetual and irrevocable in the Preamble. In name of such a rigidity the pro-
gressive evolution toward parliamentarianism, able to subject the Executive to the con-
trol of the Parliament and not of the King, was rejected in theory by conservationists2 
and in practice when the King literally interpreted its power to ‘appoint and revoke his 
ministers’ (art. 65) and appointed Mussolini as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the lack of 
amending procedure allowed henceforth Fascism to change the institutional structu-
re as well as the bill of rights through the ordinary legislation formally respecting the 
legality.3 
In order to allow for constitutional ‘maintenance’, clauses on flexibility have 
been therefore progressively introduced in Constitutions, moreover since the end of 
1 This distinction was elaborated at first in SIEYES, E. J. Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état?. Paris: Boucher, 2002, distin-
guishing between pouvoir constituant (constituent power) and pouvoir constitué (constituted power). 
2 SONNINO, Sidney. Torniamo allo Statuto. Nuova Antologia, 151, p. 9-28, 1897. 
3 See BIN, Roberto. Rigidità della Costituzione. Flessibilità degli intellettuali. In: CORTESE, Fulvio (Coord.), Libe-
rare e federare: l’eredità intellettuale di Silvio Trentin. Firenze: Firenze University Press, 2016, p. 25-36, p. 29. 
entrenched in the Charter. The analysis, in a compara-
tive perspective, of the STF’s activism is the focus of this 
article. 
Keywords: constitutional amendments; constitutional 
core values; Supreme Federal Court; power of judicial re-
view; judicial activism.
partir das cláusulas pétreas consagradas na Constituição. A 
análise do ativismo do STF numa perspectiva comparativa 
é o âmago deste artigo.
Palavras-chave: emendas constitucionais; valores consti-
tucionais fundamentais; Supremo Tribunal Federal; contro-
le judicial de constitucionalidade; ativismo judicial.
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WWII, through the definition of specific procedures for the exercise of the secondary 
constituent power. The complexity of these procedures can greatly vary according to 
the required majorities, quora and time delays, but they generally aim at ensuring that 
fluctuant majorities cannot drastically modify the Constitution though safeguarding a 
certain degree of flexibility for constitutional maintenance.4 
Furthermore, through these procedures constitutional identity can be reinter-
preted5 without recurring to the exercise of the primary constituent power, by its own 
nature extra legem.6 In order to control this reinterpretation, however, in some consti-
tuent experiences framers have vaguely declared the unamendability of ‘spirit’ of the 
Constitution. A choice still allowing for great margins of interpretation because ‘the 
spirit of the constitution is, in fact, unlikely to be encapsulated in single words […]. 
Rather than requiring a predetermined meaning, the ‘spirit’ of the Constitution admits 
shifts of meaning’.7 A reference to the ‘spirit’ can be found, for instance, in art. 152 of the 
1992 Constitution of Estonia, recognizing to the Supreme Court the power to annul 
‘any law or other legislation that is in conflict with the provisions and spirit of the Cons-
titution’. Similarly, art. 116 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal stated the impossibility to 
introduce amendments violating the ‘spirit of the Preamble’. The vagueness and multi-
faceted meaning of the latter allowed the Supreme Court to enforce its own interpre-
tation of such a spirit and ‘legally put down any rebellion against judicial authority’.8 In 
other constituent experiences, instead, framers identified constitutional identity and 
preserved it through clauses pinpointing those sacred – and therefore unamendab-
le9 through the exercise of the secondary constituent power – provisions and/or con-
cepts representing the constitutional core values. This is the case, i.e., of the 1948 Italian 
4 On the different procedures for constitutional amendments and on their consequences on constitution’s flex-
ibility, see ROZNAI, Yaniv. Amendment Power, Constituent Power and Popular Sovereignty. Linking Unamend-
ability and Amendment Procedures. In: ALBERT Richard; CONTIADES Xenophon; FOTIADOU Alkmene (Coord.). 
The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment. Oxford: Hart, 2017. p. 37. As Richard Albert 
underlines, there can be also countries providing nuanced procedures according to the relevance of the pro-
visions to be amended (ALBERT, Richard. Introduction. The State of the Art in Constitutional Amendment. In: 
ALBERT, Richard; CONTIADES Xenophon; FOTIADOU Alkmene (Coord.). The Foundations and Traditions of 
Constitutional Amendment. Oxford: Hart, 2017. p. 9). 
5 On this point see ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution. New York Uni-
versity Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, New York, Paper 514, 2015. p. 26; DIXON, Rosalind. 
Amending Constitutional Identity. Cardozo Law Review, vol. 33, p. 1847, 2011-2012; ROSENFELD, Michel. The 
Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community, London: Routledge, 
2010.
6 See KAY, Richard S. Constituent Authority. American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 59, p. 715, 2011. 
7 See PINELLI, Cesare. The Concept and Practice of Judicial Activism in the Experience of Some Western Consti-
tutional Democracies. Juridica International, vol. XIII, p. 32, 2007.
8 STITH, Richard. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Extraordinary Power of Nepal’s Supreme 
Court. American University International Law Review, vol. 11, n. 1, p. 47-77, 1996.
9 The effects of entrenching unamendable provisions have been highlighted in ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional 
Handcuffs. Arizona State Law Journal, vol. 42, n. 3, p. 663, 2010, underscoring their preservative, transfor-
mational or reconciliatory role. A further elaboration on these characteristics is proposed in ROZNAI, Yaniv. 
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Constitution, prohibiting the amendment of the republican form of government (art. 
139). Finally, in some countries Supreme Courts have inferred from the Charter implicit 
limits to constitutional amending power and have assigned to themselves the power 
of controlling the compliance with them. The most noteworthy and renowned of such 
Court is the Supreme Court of India, whose experience is discussed below. 
Such a power of judicial review of constitutional amendments raises thorny is-
sues moreover given an increasing judicial activism in the interpretation of the (explicit 
or implicit) criteria for assessing the constitutional amendments’ unconstitutionality.10 
First, the classical counter-majoritarian objection,11 roughly based on the unlimited su-
premacy of the Parliament in name of the respects of the principles of democracy and 
of people’s sovereignty, contests the possibility to vest a non-elected institution with 
the power to control the will of the (elected) representatives of the people. Conversely, 
it has been argued that some limits should be imposed for the preservation of the cons-
titutional order; as Cappelletti puts it, ‘Constitutions express the positivization’ of higher 
values; judicial review is the method for rendering such values effective’.12 Second, it 
can be questioned whether this non-elected institution has to exert it only on the for-
mal and procedural aspects or may substantively intervene in investigating the content 
of constitutional amendments. It is a relevant issue, given the cases of constitutional 
amendments infringing the core values of the Charter,13 and/or representing a consti-
tutional dismemberment,14 although they formally respect the rules and procedures.
These issues animated a vivid debate also in Brazil. Here, in the framework of 
a lengthy and detailed Charter providing also a complex system of judicial review of 
legislation, the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal (Federal Supreme Court, henceforth 
also STF) showed its , with regard to activism in the interpretation of the clausulas petre-
as (petrous clauses) preserving several constitutional features from amending power. 
Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution. New York University Public Law and Legal Theo-
ry Working Papers, New York, Paper 514, 2015. 
10 On this point, see GÖZLER, Kemal. Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments: A comparative study. 
Istanbul: Ekin, 2008. 
11 The counter-majoritarian argument has allowed the development of a vast literature. Here, it would suffice to 
mention the seminal work of BICKEL, Alexander. The Least Dangerous branch. The Supreme Court at the bar 
of politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. 
12 As CAPPELLETTI, Mauro. The judicial review in the contemporary world. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971, 
p. x. 
13 BARAK, Ahron. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. Israel Law Review, vol. 44, n. 3, p. 321-341, 
2011; ROSNAI, Yaniv. Unamendable Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017; ORAN, Doyle. Constraints in Constitutional Amendment Power. In: ALBERT 
Richard; CONTIADES Xenophon; FOTIADOU Alkmene (Coord.). The Foundations and Traditions of Constitu-
tional Amendment. Oxford: Hart, 2017. p. 74-81.
14 ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Dismemberment. Boston College Law School – Legal Studies Research 
Paper, Boston, Paper 424. 2016. 
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In this article, therefore, the case of the STF is compared with other Courts’ judicial acti-
vism for the protection of constitutional core values.
2. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNAMENDABILI-
TY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
When interpreting provisions or the intent of Charter’s authors ‘the more a jud-
ge feels himself free, in such circumstance, to give the text further meaning, the more 
he is considered ‘activist’.15 Activist courts may therefore de facto amend the Consti-
tution, somehow challenging the constituent power of framers, by radically changing 
the literal interpretation of provisions.16 The Canadian doctrine of the Constitution as a 
living tree enhancing the interpretation of the protection of rights far beyond the literal 
meaning of constitutional provisions17 is a good example of such a judicial freedom. 
Furthermore, in those legal systems explicitly providing it, Courts may also chal-
lenge the secondary constituent power by extensively interpreting their power of ju-
dicial review of constitutional amendments. In Turkey, for instance, in spite of the con-
tent of art. 148 of 1982 Constitution assigning to the Constitutional Court the power to 
control constitutional amendments only with regard to the respect of amending pro-
cedures, a substantive check has been operated when judges behaved constitutional 
core values in danger. Indeed, in 200818 the Court has used its power to strike down an 
amendment to art. 10 and 42, which would have enabled the wearing of headscarves in 
universities, on the grounds that it infringed the unamendable principle of the secular 
state.19
With regard to the challenges to secondary constituent power, as said before, 
the Supreme Court of the Union of India is the one which proved the greatest judicial 
activism, as it not only self-recognized the power of judicial review of constitutional 
amendments, but used it to wage war against the Executive’s interpretation of the 
15 See PINELLI, Cesare. The concept and practice of judicial activism in the experience of some western consti-
tutional democracies. Juridica International, vol. 13, p. 31, 2007.
16 This however does not make irrelevant the provision of the mentioned procedures for constitutional amend-
ments, as they safeguard the adherence to the rule of law and to the constitutional transparency. See DIXON, 
Rosalind. Constitutional Amendment Rules. A Comparative Perspective. Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011, p. 98. 
17 This doctrine was used for the first time ever in the famous 1929 ‘Person’s case’, when the Privy Council, at the 
time Court of last resort for Canada, recognized women’s right to be appointed at the Senate on the ground 
that, in spite of a clear mention of women as qualified persons, the provision had to be progressively interpret-
ed in order to include also women. Since then, the doctrine has been diffusely used in Canadian jurisprudence 
although contrasted by the originalist point of view. On this debate, see: MILLER, Bradley W. Beguiled by Met-
aphors: The “Living Tree” and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in Canada. Canadian Journal of Law & 
Jurisprudence, vol. 22, n. 2, p. 331-354, 2009.
18 See Constitutional Court of Turkey, 5 June 2008, n. 2008/116, Resmi Gazete 27 032 (Oct. 22, 2008).
19 According to art. 4 of 1982 Turkish Constitution, art. 1 to 3, protecting a number of principles such as the rule 
of law, Ataturk’s nationalism, secularism, state integrity and republicanism, are unamendable.
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directive principles entrenched in the 1949 Union’s Constitution. At the beginning, 
the Court used its power of judicial review of legislation to strike down the laws for 
land expropriation enacted at the end of the ’60s; notably, in the 1967 Golak Nath deci-
sion,20 supporting land owners’ claims against the violation of their property rights, the 
Court enunciated that the legislative power is bound to the respect of constitutional 
core principles, which include property rights. Then, when Indira Gandhi’s government 
(elected in 1971) pushed the Parliament to pass constitutional amendments entren-
ching nationalization and land redistribution in the Charter, the Supreme Court issued 
the Kesavananda Bharati decision.21 In this decision, the Court made two revolutionary 
interpretations of the Constitution: first, it inferred from the power of judicial review 
of legislation provided in the Charter an implicit power to review also constitutional 
amendments; second, it affirmed the existence of a ‘basic structure of the Constitution’ 
constitutional amendments, although duly passed by the legislature, cannot infringe or 
alter.22 Finally, when the Parliament passed another constitutional amendment which 
would have attributed itself an unlimited amending power, the Court issued the Mi-
nerva Mills decision23 clarifying that the amending power cannot infringe the identity 
of the existing Constitution. Since then, several other Courts adopted an approach to 
constitutional amendments based on the ‘basic structure doctrine’ in order to state the 
existence of implicit limits.24 
In a global comparison, this approach to constitutional amending power is cou-
nterbalanced by Courts having adopted a strong judicial restraint in compliance with a 
rigid respect of the principle of parliamentary supremacy. A quite renowned example 
of judicial restraint is the 1962 decision of the French Conseil Constitutionnel over the 
amendments passed with a popular referendum on the election of the President of the 
Republic.25 Acting as the Montesquieu’s bouche de la loi, the Conseil declared itself bou-
nd by people’s sovereignty and refused to check the constitutionality of a constitutional 
20 Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 1967 2 SCR 762.
21 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 1973 4 SCC 225.
22 In Kesavananda the basic structure was defined as to include the supremacy of the Constitution, the republi-
can and democratic form of government, the secular character of the State, the separation of power principle, 
the federative nature of the state. Nevertheless, this is not a closed list, and the Supreme Court of India has add-
ed (or removed) some elements from time to time. For an account of this evolution, see MEHTA, Pratap Bhanu. 
The inner conflict of constitutionalism. Judicial review and the ‘basic structure’. In: HASAN, Zoya; SRIDHARAN, 
Eswaran.  (Coord.) Indian’s living constitution: Ideas, practices, controversies. London: Anthem Press, 2005. 
p. 179-206. 
23 Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1 SCR 206 [1981].  
24 For some examples, see COLÒN-RIOS, Joel. Beyond parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy: the 
doctrine of implicit limits to constitutional reform in Latin America. Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review, vol. 44, p. 521-534, 2013; MOHALLEM, Michael F. Immutable Clauses and Judicial Review in India, Brazil 
and South Africa. Expanding Constitutional Courts’ Authority. The International Journal of Human Rights, 
vol. 15, n. 5, p. 765-766, 2011. 
25 See Conseil Constitutionnel, 62-20 DC, 6 November 1962.
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amendment approved by referendum.26 A lack of competence confirmed in 2003, when 
the French people was not even directly involved in the approval of the constitutional 
amendment.27 
More nuanced, finally, has been the attitude of the German Federal Constitutio-
nal Tribunal. Facing the lack of an explicit recognition of the power of judicial review 
of constitutional amendments in 1949 German Basic Law, the Tribunal demonstrated 
a certain activism and self-attributed it in 1951.28 Notably, it argued that, because the 
Basic Law is a logical unity and its provisions cannot be interpreted independently, tho-
se amendments infringing the higher law and fundamental principles on which the 
Charter is based should be deemed as unconstitutional and are therefore null and void. 
Two years later,29 the Tribunal added that constitutional amendments infringing those 
provisions higher than the Basic Law should be deemed as unconstitutional as well 
and should be therefore struck down. The parameter for assessing the unconstitutio-
nality of constitutional amendments has varied since then, nevertheless respecting the 
approach that the power of the Parliament to amend the fundamental Charter can be 
limited when it infringes constitutional core values.30 Nevertheless, the post-war ac-
tivism, deemed necessary when the protection of the constitutional core values was 
relevant to hinder possible resurgences of the authoritarian phenomenon,31 had been 
progressively abandoned in favour of a more strict respect of art. 79.3 ‘eternity clause’ 
providing the explicit unamendability only for art. 1 and 20, respectively protecting 
human dignity and the principles of the democratic and social federal state and of the 
rule of law.32
The position of Courts briefly summarized here represents the main compa-
rative spectrum in which the STF jurisprudence on constitutional amendment can be 
analysed. 
26 On the role attributed to people’s sovereignty in the French context, see DEROSIER, Jean-Philippe. The French 
People’s role in amending the Constitution. In: ALBERT Richard; CONTIADES Xenophon; FOTIADOU Alkmene 
(Coord.). The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment. Oxford: Hart, 2017; and BARAN- 
GER, Danis. The Language of eternity. Constitutional review of amending power in France (or the absence 
thereof ). Israel Law Review, vol. 44, p. 389, 2011. 
27 See Conseil Constitutionnel, 2003-469 DC, 26 March 2003.
28 Südweststaat, 2 BverfGE (1951).
29 See Article 117, 3 BverfGE (1953). 
30 For the other relevant cases on this topic, see Klass 30 BverfGE (1970), Land Reform I 84 BverfGE (1991), Land 
Reform II 94 BverfGE (1996), Lisbon Treaty 2 BverfGE (2009). 
31 This point was clearly assessed in BRECHT, Arnold. Federalism and Regionalism in Germany. The Division 
of Prussia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, p. 138. 
32 For a scholarly analysis of this evolution, see PREUSS Ulrich K. The implication of the eternity clauses: the 
German experience. Israel Law Review, vol. 44, p. 429, 2011.  
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3. THE UNCERTAIN UNAMENDABILITY OF 1988 BRAZILIAN CONS-
TITUTION 
The possibility to amend 1988 Brazilian Constitution has represented a crucial 
element since its entry into force, probably for its extreme relevance in the process of 
consolidation of the Brazilian democracy as well as for the circumstances in which it 
was drafted. Working to a new Charter after a very long period of authoritarianism33 
and only thanks to a transition the military in power started in 1974 for still controver-
sial reasons,34 the 559 members of the Congress elected on 15 November 198635 had 
to serve both as a unicameral constituent assembly36 and as a bicameral ordinary legis-
lature under the pressures to be re-elected and at the same time to provide for a text 
able to control possible future deviations of the governing bodies. Since the first cons-
tituent phases, Congressmen therefore refused to work on a draft already prepared by 
constitutional law scholars,37 willing to safeguard the Assembly’s independence in the 
exercise of the constituent power. In order to ensure an open and democratic process, 
the civil society was also encouraged in presenting proposals through the mechanism 
of the popular amendment.38 
The approval of the Charter 19 months later seemed not to exhaust the exercise 
of the primary constituent power. Indeed, art. 2 of the Temporary Constitutional Pro-
visions Act (TCA) called for a popular referendum five years after the entry into force 
of the Constitution to decide between the monarchical and the republican form of 
government.39 Furthermore, art. 3 TCA envisaged the possibility that the Constitution 
33 All along the so-called Old Republic (1891-1930) the country was led by a de facto single party system also 
providing an elitist suffrage mechanism (only the 3% of the population was entitled to vote), then followed by 
a period of subsequent military coups – only briefly interrupted by a democratic period – which lasted until 
1985. In a nutshell, before the approval of 1988 Constitution, the country actually experience only 16 years of 
democracy in the 166 years since its independence from Portugal.
34 See ROSENN, Keith S. Conflict resolution and constitutionalism. The making of the Brazilian Constitution of 
1988. In: MILLER Laurel E., AUCOIN Louis (Coord.). Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in 
Constitution Making. Washington, DC: USIP, 2010, p. 435-466.
35 However, it included a Senate indirectly elected by an Electoral College established in 1982 under the previ-
ous authoritarian electoral legislation.
36 It is worthy to remind that, when acting as constituent framers, the members of the Congress divided in eight 
thematic commissions, each of them split into three sub-commissions. The final systematization effort was 
then led by a Commission of 97 members. 
37 A limited guidance was however provided by the draft elaborated by the Committee led by the distinguished 
jurist Afonso Arinos appointed by President Sarney. Although he finally decided not to submit Arinos’ draft to 
the Congress, the ideas it contained flawed in the Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, the Assembly enjoyed 
of the translations in Portuguese of foreign constitutions.
38 It requires the signatures of at least 30,000 voters and has to be organized by at least three legally constituted 
associative entities responsible for the authenticity of the signatures.
39 The referendum was held on 21 April 1993 and the population decided in favour of the republican form of 
government (66% against 10.2%). Called to decide also on the system of government, people chose for presi-
dentialism (55.4% against 24.6%).
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could have been completely revised in 1993 by an absolute majority of Congress in a 
unicameral session. A possibility that however never materialized both for the oppo-
sition of important NGOs and for the emergence of a corruption scandal, nicknamed 
Budget-gate, meanwhile diverting the attention of Congressmen.40 
At the end of such a long constituent process, Brazil was endowed with a long 
and detailed Charter,41 constitutionalizing almost every aspect of what was deemed 
important for the institutional life and for the protection of individual and collective 
rights and also entrenching directive principles for public policies, on the example of 
the 1937 Irish Constitution. Finally, due to framers reluctance in vesting with the sec-
ondary constituent power only the federal Legislature, art. 60 of the Charter attributes 
the constitutional amending power to several institutional actors42 and defines the pro-
cedure for exercising it.43 Furthermore, art. 60.4 imposes specific limits to the content 
of constitutional amendments: ‘No proposal of amendment shall be considered which 
is aimed at abolishing the federative form of the State; the direct, secret, universal and 
periodic vote; the separation of the Government Powers; individual rights and guaran-
tees’.44 These limits have been defined as clausulas petreas (petrous clauses) and, as Ros-
nai underlines, they are able to stand against the exercise of constitutional amending 
power but can be obliterated by the exercise of constituent power as ‘even rocks cannot 
withstand the volcanic outburst of the primary constituent power’.45 
The provision of unamendable clauses is not an innovation in the Brazilian con-
stitutional framework and already 1891 Constitution – enacted after the abolition of 
the Unitary Monarchy – protected from amending power the republican federal form 
of government as well as the representation of the states in the Senate (art. 90.4). Since 
then, similar clauses, inspired to those into force in the USA and in Portugal, were then 
included in 1934, 1946, and 1967 Constitutions. Nevertheless, scholars have contested 
the effectiveness and genuinity of these clauses: because authoritarianism was none-
theless established, they have been considered a result of constitutional stickiness;46 
40 For further details on this, see ROSENN, Keith S. Conflict resolution and constitutionalism. The making of the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988. In: MILLER Laurel E., AUCOIN Louis (Coord.) Framing the State in Times of Tran-
sition: Case Studies in Constitution Making. Washington, DC: USIP, 2010, p. 435-466, p. 453. 
41 It was composed of 245 articles, plus the 70 articles in the Temporary Constitutional Provisions Act.
42 It is assigned to one-third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies or of the Federal Senate, to the Pres-
ident of the Republic, and to more than one half of the Legislative Assemblies of the units of the Federation 
each of them expressing itself by the relative majority of its members. 
43 A three-fifth majority and two rounds of deliberations in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
is required. According to the rules of procedure of both Houses, once approved on first reading five sessions 
must follow before a second reading takes place. Rejected or impaired amendments cannot be subject of 
another proposal in the same legislative session.
44 For the full text of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, see http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution. 
45 See ROSNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The limits pf Amendment Powers. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 164. 
46 VAROL, Ozan O. Constitutional Stickiness. UC Davis Law Review, vol. 49, p. 899, 2016.
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being a ‘void’ repetition of clauses on unamendability they have been deemed as a 
‘bricolage’, that is a constitutional borrowing from foreign provisions ‘at hand’.47 
Conversely, although they repeat some of the clauses already entrenched in 
previous Constitutions, clausolas petreas provide for some innovations. First, the formu-
la protecting the nature of the State does not mention the Republican form of govern-
ment, but only its federative form.48 This lack can be explained by the need of keeping 
the door opened for an amendment waiting for the results of the mentioned 1993 re-
ferendum and the possible complete constitutional revision.  Furthermore, and more 
relevantly, a great innovation was the unamendability concerning ‘individual rights and 
guarantees’, completely unheard in the previous Brazilian constitutional history. 
For the consequences it has had in engendering STF’s activism, it is worthy to 
summarise the system of judicial review of legislation 1988 Constitution provides. It 
mixed the incidental and diffuse mechanism, entitling every judge with such a power, 
with the Kelsenian model of abstract control in the hand of an ad hoc Court, which in 
the case of Brazil is the Supremo Tribunal Federal and not a Constitutional Court esta-
blished with this aim. Therefore, STF serves as a court of last resort49 in the inter partes 
decisions of unconstitutionality issued by ordinary judges in cases of recursos extra-
ordinarios,50 and it acts also as an ad hoc court in the four direct and abstract actions, 
having an erga omnes effect,51 the Constitution provides. Finally, it should be reminded 
that, while drafting a so complex discipline of the power of judicial review of legislation 
– which empowers the STF through numerous tools for adjudicating on the activity 
(and on the omissions) of the Parliament and of the Government and at the same time 
undermines its authority subjugating the erga omnes effect of some decision to the 
will of the Senate – framers also ‘forgot’ to individuate a body entitled to enforce the 
protection of the clausulas petreas.
47 ROSNAI, Yaniv. Unamendability and the genetic code of the constitution. New York University Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Paper, New York, Paper 514, 2015. p. 24-25.
48 For a comparison among Brazilian Constitutions, notably with reference to the unamendability clauses, see 
MAIA, Luciano. The Creation and amending process in the Brazilian Constitution. In: ANDENAS M. (Coord.). The 
creation and amendment of Constitutional Norms. Cheltenham: BIIC, 2000, p. 54-86. 
49 In a system already lacking of the principle of the binding precedent, the STF’s authoritative power in the 
decisions issued under this capacity is lessened by the Senate of the Congress’ competence to evaluate on the 
possibility to abrogate provisions the STF declared unconstitutional, which however is something the Senate 
has very rarely done, thus limiting the declarations of unconstitutionality to an inter partes effect.
50 It is worthy to note that since 2004 these appeals are filtered through the provision that they may be intro-
duced only when the case at hand has a general impact on the national legal system (Constitutional Amend-
ment n. 45, 8 December 2004). On the relevance of this amendment for the evolution of the constitutional 
control of legislation in Brazil see DIAS TOFFOLI, José Antônio. Democracy in Brazil, The evolving role of the 
country’s Supreme Court. Boston College International and Comparative law Review, vol. 40, 2017. p. 245; 
ROSENN, Keith S. Judicial Reform in Brazil. Law & Business Review of the Americas, vol. 19, 1998. 
51 Since the approval of the Law n.11.417, 19 December 2006, the STF may also approve, with a specific majori-
ty, a sumula vinculante, providing a specific interpretation with an erga omnes binding effect. 
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3.1. Unamendability in the interpretation of the Supremo Tribunal Fe-
deral
Matching the almost yearly enactment of a constitutional amendment with the 
‘amendment difficulty’52 clausulas petreas should represent can be quite hard without 
underscoring that the most part of these amendments did not concern the core of the 
Constitution. As Benvindo highlighted,53 some of them may be considered ‘awkward in 
a comparative perspective’, such as the one for authorizing municipalities to establish 
a contribution to finance the public lighting service,54 for allocating funds destined to 
irrigation,55 for excluding from the monopoly of the union the exploitation of radioi-
sotopes,56 and for introducing the monthly pension for rubber tappers.57 Some others, 
however, have been quite relevant for the system, such as those allowing the re-elec-
tion for a single subsequent term for presidents, governors and mayors,58 and introdu-
cing a more restrictive rule for presidents to adopt provisional measures.59 
The reason of this vast exercise of the constitutional amending power can be 
traced back to the said wide content of the Charter imposing specific directions to the 
future policy-making. Therefore, the only way for realizing policies different from those 
provided in the Constitution is to proceed to constitutional amendments.60 
In this activity of ‘adaptation’ of the text to the political programs of the gover-
nments the Supremo Tribunal Federal has positioned as a very relevant political actor61 
since it self-recognized a power of judicial review of constitutional amendments at the 
beginning of ’90s, inferring it from the power of judicial review of legislation (art. 102). 
52 GINSBURG, Tom; MELTON, James. Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cul-
tures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty. Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics, 
Working Paper No. 682, 2014. p. 5.
53 See BENVINDO, Juliano Zaiden. The Brazilian Constitutional Amendment Rate: A Culture of Change?, Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law Blog. Available at: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/08/the-brazil-
ian-constitutionalamendment-rate-a-culture-of-change/>. Last accessed: 10 Aug. 2016.
54 Constitutional Amendment n. 39 (December 19, 2002).
55 Constitutional Amendment n. 43 (April 15, 2004).
56 Constitutional Amendment n. 49 (February 8, 2006).
57 Constitutional Amendment n. 78 (May 14, 2014).
58 Constitutional Amendment n. 16 (June 4, 1997).
59 Constitutional Amendment n. 32 (September 11, 2001).
60 COUTO, Cláudio Gonçalves; RANTES, Rogério Bastos. Constituição, Governo e Democracia no Brasil. Revista 
Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, vol. 21, n. 61, 2006. A noteworthy case in this regard concerns the constitutional 
amendments introduced for favouring the free marked. This topic is vastly analysed in MENDES Conrado Hübner. 
Constitutions and Institutions: Justice, Identity and Reform. Judicial review of constitutional amendments in the 
Brazilian Supreme Court. Florida Journal of International Law, vol. 17, n. 3, p. 449-461, 2005.
61 Actually, according to ARANTES, Rogério Bastos. Direito e política: o ministério público e a defesa dos direitos 
coletivos.  Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, vol. 14, p. 83-102, p. 83, 1999 the whole Judiciary plays a 
very relevant role in the system established in 1988 as re-democratization conceived it both as tool for finally 
ensuring justice after the military regime and as an arbiter between the society and the powers of the State. 
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Notably, in a 1991 decision the STF affirmed that, because constitutional amendments 
are an exercise of the secondary constituent power, they can be the object of an abs-
tract control and, in order to protect the constitutional identity defined by the clauses of 
unamendability, even of an a posteriori review.62 The Supremo Tribunal Federal has also 
explicitly stated that the clauses on unamendability serve to the scope of preserving the 
continuity and the identity of the Charter,63 which may be altered only through the exer-
cise of the (primary) constituent power. Furthermore, because ‘procedures to introduce 
constitutional changes, are expression of an instituted constituent power, thus limited by 
nature […] constitutional changes deriving from a revision are subject to judicial control 
and scrutiny as regard the petrous clauses’.64 This approach has been constantly confirme-
d,65 also clarifying that ‘a constitutional amendment, which is emanated from a derived 
constituent, when violative of the original constitution, may be declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court, which is the guardian of the constitution’.66 
This subordinated relation between constituent and constituted powers has 
been applied also to the hierarchy between States Constitutions and Federal Constitu-
tion and about the amendments to the former, Thus, in the exercise of their constituent 
power, the units of the federation should strictly conform to the federal Charter;67 a rule 
a fortiori valid for units’ constitutional amendments.   
A very interesting case about the judicial review of constitutional amendments 
occurred in 2006, with reference to the amendment, which some scholars defined as an 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment behaving it infringes the protected cons-
titutional core values,68 approved on 16 December 2006 as a reaction to the economic 
malfunction at the federal level. It introduced a New Tax Regime and modified the con-
tent of the Act of Transitional Constitutional Provisions in order to provide since 2017 
for a twenty-year limit to Brazilian public expenditures accorded to the yearly variation 
of the inflation rate, somehow limiting the state commitment in protecting social rights 
and in ensuring public services – such as i.e. health, education, social assistance and se-
curity – to which the Constitution bound the state in Title III. Evidently, the amendment, 
although approved respecting the provided procedures, clashed with two elements 
included in the clausulas petreas, namely the federal structure of the state and funda-
mental rights, at the point that it seems aimed at dismembering constitutional rights 
62 See ADIMC 466/91 DF.
63 ADIN n. 815- 3/ DF, DJU de 10/ 05/ 96. 
64 ADIMC 981-8/600/93 PR, Dec. 93. 
65 See i.e., ADIMC 926/ 1993 and ADIMC 981– 8/ 600/ 93 PR. 
66ADIN 939-7 DF. 
67 ADIMC 568-5/600/91 AM, 1991. 
68 See ROZNAI, Yaniv; KREUZ, Letícia Regina Camargo. Conventionality control and Amendment 95/2016: a Bra-
zilian case of unconstitutional constitutional amendment. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curiti-
ba, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 35-56, mai./ago. 2018.
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with long-lasting effects on a whole generation and even beyond;69  the amendment 
also seems to infringe the welfare state that the Constitution wanted to establish.
The Brazilian doctrine has already debated on the Judiciary’s adjudications able 
to alter the public policies on the budget. Notably, Baracho stated the ‘it is reasonable 
to imagine that the Judicial Branch does not intend to be responsible for the economic 
difficulties that a judicial decision might produce. […] It is undoubtedly important to 
preserve the integrity of the Judicial Branch, but it is also essential to secure the exer-
cise of the fundamental rights, even if for that, in certain circumstances, it is necessary, 
based on constitutional principles, to stop public policies’.70 The STF has confirmed this 
approach when it declared the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto at art. 55, 2 
of the Budget Guidelines Law n. 10.707/2003, which violated the 29/2000 Constitutio-
nal amendment establishing a minimum of final resources for founding health services 
and actions.71 On that occasion, the STF recognized its lack of competence in defining 
public policies at the same time considering a responsibility of the Judiciary to inter-
vene when the Executive or the Legislature fail to respect their incumbencies and risk 
the efficiency and integrity of the individual and/or collective rights constitutionally 
granted. Therefore, the Judiciary’s, and moreover the STF’s, role in the protection of ri-
ghts and in favour of the Brazilian constitutional identity seems a consolidated given.72 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The STF’s activist attitude, however, is still controversial because it not only con-
firms the power of a non-elected body to control the decision of the representatives of 
the people, but transforms the Court in a policy-makers, allowing it for opting among 
the different policies through the approval or refusal of an amendment. It is also contro-
versial because there is no certainty that the interpretation the Court will provide is it-
self consistent with the Constitution and able to conform to the constitutional identity. 
69 ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 
43, n. 1, 2018. 
70 See BARACHO JUNIOR, J. A. O. A interpretação dos direitos fundamentais na Suprema Corte dos EUA e no 
Supremo Tribunal Federal. In: SAMPAIO, José Adércio Leite (Coord). Jurisdição constitucional e direitos fun-
damentais. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2003. p. 343. 
71 See ADPF 45, DJ 29.04.2004.
72 A suggestion may come from the comparative studies with reference to the South Africa Constitutional Court 
approach to the realization of social rights, which has constantly pushed the government in adopting pro-
grams able to secure them notwithstanding the scarcity of resources. In the literature, see SUNSTEIN, Cass R. 
Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper 
12, 2001.
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Paraphrasing Plato73 and Giovenale74, there is no one controlling those who have the 
power to control. 
Such an issue is even more relevant when the text to be interpreted has an open 
texture, as the Brazilian one, attributing to its interpreter the power to fill the empty 
box framers provided. In these cases ‘it cannot be said that judicial decisions preserve 
its [the Charter’s] supremacy. They would preserve, instead, the understanding that the 
Court has of those open norms’.75
Although these are valid objections – on which the counter-majoritarian argu-
ment and the so-called political constitutionalism76 have been built up – in the case of 
Brazil, and possibly of Latin American countries in general, the role the Judiciary plays 
in protecting rights enjoys of a huge popular support and it is grounded on the detailed 
references to individual and group rights as well as to State policies entrenched in the 
Charter. Even when this entails an adjudication on the allotment of the State budget, 
therefore, STF’s activism confirms the will of Brazilian Judiciary in supporting the trans-
formation of paper rights into real guarantees. As a consequence, however, it has repre-
sented a source of tension with political authorities, which have frequently underlined 
how this activism has penalized the efficiency of the courts.77 A rationale on which, for 
instance, the 2004 Judicial Reform Constitutional Amendment has been approved. It 
is worthy to note, in the end, that even when intervening on the functioning of the 
Judiciary, the legislator has safeguarded the power of judicial review of constitutional 
amendments in spite of some speculations in the Brazilian legal doctrine suggesting 
the possibility of abolishing it. According to Ferreira Filho,78 indeed, clausulas petreas are 
not themselves unamendable so that, in order to amend the provisions they protect, it 
73 PLATO. The Republic, III. p. 13. 
74 GIOVENALE. Satire, VI. p. 48-49. 
75 MENDES Conrado Hübner. Constitutions and Institutions: Justice, Identity and Reform. Judicial review of con-
stitutional amendments in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Florida Journal of International Law, vol. 17, n. 3, p. 
449-461, 2005. p. 459.
76 On political constitutionalism, limiting the role of Courts in the review of legislation and a fortiori of con-
stitutional amendments, see BELLAMY, Richard. Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defense of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; GOLDONI, Marco. Che cos’è il 
costituzionalismo politico? Diritto e Questioni Pubbliche, vol. 10, 2010; TUSHNET, Mark. Taking the Consti-
tution away from the Courts. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999; Id, The relation between political 
constitutionalism and weak-form judicial review. German Law Journal, vol. 14, n. 12, 2013; WALDRON, Jeremy. 
The Core of the Case against Judicial Review. The Yale Law Journal, vol. 115, p. 1346, 2006. For some thoughts 
more strictly related to the Brazilian context, see LIMA, Jairo Néia; BEÇAK, Rubens. Emenda Constitucional e 
Constitucionalismo Político: A Potencial Moderação Das Críticas Ao Controle Judicial De Constitucionalidade. 
Conpedi Law Review, vol. 2, n. 4, p. 275-296, 2016.
77 On the functioning of Brazilian Judiciary, moreover with reference to rights’ protection, see ROSENN, Keith S. 
Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil. The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 59, 
n. 4, p. 1009-1050, 2011.
78 FERREIRA FILHO, Manoel Gonçalves. Significação e alcance das ‘clausulas pétreas’. Revista de Direito Admi-
nistrativo, vol. 220, p. 11-17, 1995.
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would suffice to proceed to a double amendment procedure, first amending art. 60 and 
then the core constitutional values it protects. Actually, this is a minority position in the 
Brazilian literature, being predominant the idea that unamendable clauses are intrinsi-
cally unamendable, although this is not explicitly stated in the Charter;79 a position the 
STF already put forward in 1991 declaring the ‘National Congress […] legally bound by 
the original constituent power, which has laid down, besides circumstantial entrench-
ment to reform, an immutable clause, immune to parliamentary revision’.80 
Looking at the Brazilian experience in a comparative perspective, therefore, a sort 
of ‘basic structure doctrine’ entrenched in the clausulas pétreas and protected through 
the judicial review of constitutional amendments seems well established, as well as the 
principle according to which the complete alteration of the genetic code of the Consti-
tution81 can be realized only through a new exercise of the primary constituent power.
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